

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

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1. INTRODUCTION

Analytic philosophy has been an important trend in the twentieth century, especially in Britain and America, so much so the departments of philosophy were graded based on their strength in this field. It is believed to have begun at the turn of the twentieth century as a reaction to idealism. It gathered a phenomenal momentum. But already sixty years from its birth it was seen to be declining and they were talking of the 'death' of analytic philosophy. This paper aims to look at the history of analytic philosophy in its life of about a century, the way analytic philosophers saw the history of philosophy that preceded them, and the way analytic philosophers viewed their own history.

2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

2.1 1900-1910: Revolution of Moore and Russell

It was the time when Absolute Idealism reigned supreme in British universities. Idealism claimed that the world is a single indivisible whole and that only naively it appears to be a collection of discrete objects. Every object is what it is because of its relation to everything else. It is a mistake to say that any one thing exists *simpliciter*.¹ Moore and Russell revolted against idealism and defended the ordinary view of the world (realism): there are many things which exist *simpliciter*. In their refutation of idealism, they resorted to language analysis.² For example, in "The Refutation of Idealism" (*Mind* 12 (1903)), G. E. Moore takes the foundational statement of idealism '*esse is percipi*' and analyses it. He enquires into the meaning of the word '*percipi*'. Then he enquires into the function of the copula 'is'. And he proceeds in this way. The term 'Analytic philosophy' comes from this 'analysis' of language.

2.2 1910-1930: Russell and Early Wittgenstein

Moore believed in the object theory of meaning, i.e., meaning of the sentence is the object or the state of affairs it refers to. To be meaningful, a sentence should refer to

a state of affairs. But there were problems with such a theory of meaning because there were meaningful sentences which did not have objects. For example, the statements that deny the existence of something, such as 'The golden mountain does not exist' which does not have an object. To solve this problem, Russell proposed the theory of descriptions. It says that the denoting phrases (phrases that involve a noun preceded by a/an/some/any/every/all/the) are incomplete symbols, i.e., they do not have meaning on their own, but only in the context of a complete sentence that expresses a proposition. These complex sentences can be rephrased into sentences which are meaningful but yet do not refer to anything non-existent. For example, the sentence 'The golden mountain does not exist' is analysed as, 'It is not the case that there is exactly one thing that is a mountain and is golden'. Moreover, Russell put this analysis into a symbolic form (symbolic logic, ideal language) that made the analysed proposition exceedingly clear.³

Russell and Wittgenstein, impelled by the clarity of the symbolic logic, proposed a metaphysical system of reality, logical atomism. The tenets of logical atomism are as follows: A word ('leaf') stands for an atomic fact (leaf). Words form propositions. An atomic proposition mirrors the combination of atomic facts (the leaf is green). A molecular proposition, which is made by linking atomic propositions by true functional connectives such as AND, OR and NOT mirrors a complex fact.⁴ Logical atomism limited meaningfulness to the realm of phenomena studied by natural sciences. Accordingly, a sentence would be meaningful only if it refers to the phenomena which are studied by empirical sciences. And consequently, traditional philosophical statements were reduced to non-sense propositions.⁵

2.3 1930-1945: Logical Positivism and Quine

Logical positivism was proposed by the thinkers of the Vienna Circle. The prominent thinkers were Mortiz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl, Freidrich Waismann and Rudolph Carnap. It was popularized in England by A. J. Ayer. Logical positivists reduced all statements to empirical statements and held a verification theory of meaning, which says that any non-tautological statement (i.e., synthetic) is meaningful, only if it can be empirically verified.⁶ All the rest, they dismissed as meaningless. W.V.O. Quine, an American philosopher of the analytic tradition, demonstrated the untenability of logical positivism. He showed that no genuine distinction can be drawn between analytic and synthetic propositions, upon which the verification theory was resting.⁷ He also demonstrated that verification theory of meaning cannot be applied even to scientific facts, because many scientific claims and concepts went beyond what can be verified empirically. For example, 'the sun will come up tomorrow'. Therefore, the verification is never absolute. So also is falsification. This is Quine's holistic view of meaning and verification ('meaning holism').⁸

2.4 1945-1965: Later Wittgenstein

After publishing the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein retired from philosophy and took up teaching in a school. There, he had an occasion to rethink his views. He concluded that language has no universally correct structure (no ideal language). Each language system is like a game that functions according to its own rules. These rules cannot be stated but can only be shown, shown in the complex form of life of any linguistic community. Therefore, meaning has its use in the particular system. An utterance has meaning if it has a role to play in the language system.⁹ This is called ordinary language philosophy (also called as Oxford philosophy). The other ordinary language philosophers are John Wisdom, John Austin, Gilbert Ryle, Peter Strawson and Paul Grice. It became a dominant philosophy after the Second World War.

2.5 The 1960s and after

By the mid 1960s, there was a decline of linguistic philosophy. The reasons were the following:¹⁰ (1) There were deep divisions within the analytic movement between ideal and ordinary language groups on the nature of language and meaning, and on the method of philosophising. (2) Analytic view of philosophy was that all philosophical problems were linguistic illusions, and demanded that boundaries are clearly marked to stay within its limits. But that was difficult because the linguistic meaning was turning out to be a puzzling phenomenon. (3) Among them there were different theories of meaning and they were never sufficiently clear. (4) There were the deadly criticisms of Wittgenstein and Quine. (5) Ordinary language approach was far too short of a serious philosophical work. It has now become philosophy of language. Epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, ethics, metaphysics, aesthetics, socio-political philosophy, feminist philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of law, cognitive science, history of philosophy are all its areas of enquiry.

3. ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY'S CONFRONTATION WITH HISTORY

Having outlined the history, we shall deal with the relationship of analytic philosophy to history. We shall begin by looking at analytic philosophy's parting ways with idealism.

3.1 Anti-metaphysical Stance

Analytic philosophy had an anti-metaphysical stance. It moved away from traditional system-building techniques of philosophy (world-views, grand philosophical systems). As opposed to this, it had narrowness of focus. They focussed on narrowly defined philosophical questions, which were considered in isolation, without reference to historical context, or social context or intellectual context. They considered mostly linguistic problems. In "The Refutation of Idealism" G. E. Moore adopted an analytic style. He analysed the words in '*esse is percipi*' and claimed that the idealists used words in an

unwarranted way. So the analytic philosophers' objections to idealism are on the matter of style: the content is obscured by a style which renders unclear what it is talking about.¹¹ Their attack against metaphysics is that metaphysicians are using words where it cannot appropriately be used. It is like wearing the shoe on the head! Or it is like wearing the shoe on the wrong foot. One 'can' wear it on the wrong foot, but he should suffer the pain. If it is worn on the proper foot, it serves the purpose for which it is made.

3.2 Confrontation with Continental Philosophy

The term 'continental philosophy' is to be understood geographically from the perspective of the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, 'the continent' is used to refer to the mainland of Europe as distinct from the British Isles (Great Britain, Ireland and surrounding islands).¹² So 'continental philosophy' refers to the philosophy after Kant such as idealism, phenomenology, Saussurean linguistics, existentialism, Marxism, etc., which flourished on the mainland Europe. It is also to be noted that the term 'continental philosophy' was coined, not by European thinkers but by academic philosophy departments in the Anglo-American world, eager to differentiate it from 'analytic' thought.¹³ Analytic philosophers were happy about this construction, but continental philosophers would not take the term seriously. The label 'continental' makes sense only as a construct within 'analytic' philosophy as its other.¹⁴ But the term has come to stay in the philosophical circles. The irony of this division: Many stalwarts of the analytic philosophy are from the continent of Europe such as Frege, Wittgenstein, Vienna circle philosophers, Karl Popper, Carnap, etc. Richard Campbell calls it, the hegemony of analytic philosophy: "Whenever a strong but partisan group tries to impose a closure in order to privilege its own orthodoxy, those left outside tend to be lumped together under a single uncomfortable designation. Such has been the hegemony of "analytic" philosophy in English-speaking universities – in Britain, north America, and Australasia – that the politics of academic philosophy have been structured in its own terms."¹⁵

There was constant opposition between analytic philosophers and continental philosophers, but not on the level of philosophical discussions: continental philosophers called the analytics as a bunch of small-minded logic choppers and the analytic philosophers called the continental philosophers as a bunch of wooley minded gasbags.¹⁶ Such is the case witnessed in the following episode.¹⁷ Derrida, philosopher of the continental tradition, was being considered by Cambridge University for an award of an honorary doctorate. Nineteen philosophers of the analytic tradition, including Barry Smith, David Armstrong, Ruth Barcan Marcus, W.V.O. Quine, Rene Thom, and Dallas Willard, wrote to the University (*The Times*, 9th May 1992) as to why Derrida did not merit such an honour. Some of the allegations (evaluations) are: (1) He was not a philosopher, because he was not recognised by the contemporary institution of philosophy (i.e., analytic tradition). (2) His writings were not philosophical. He was making a career translating into academic sphere tricks and gimmicks. (3) His style did not facilitate understanding.

3.3 Evaluation of Non-analytic Philosophy

Michael Dummett, speaking of the situation of Oxford departments of philosophy in the 40s and 50s, says that there was tremendous self confidence and tremendous insularity, and that most philosophers of that university were convinced that all interesting work in philosophy was done at Oxford, and that they thought that nothing valuable was being done in America and still less on the continent of Europe.¹⁸

Sociologist Kieran Healy recently conducted a study of the raw data upon PGR's rankings (*The Philosophical Gourmet Report*, a ranking of graduate programs in philosophy). He found that a department's overall ranking was primarily based on strengths in metaphysics and the philosophy of language. The strengths in philosophy of mind, philosophy and science, epistemology and ethics, continental philosophy, medieval philosophy and philosophy of religion were considered secondary.¹⁹

Tyler Burge in his 1999 presidential address to the Western division of American Philosophical Association, through the presentation of a fictional dialogue between a certain Professor Carwittup and a prospective student, shows how over the course of the 20th century analytic philosophers managed to alienate academic philosophy both from the academic disciplines and from the general public. As they talk, Professor Carwittup dismisses as unscientific every topic the student suggests that he would be interested in, such as the meaning of life, the quest for truth, the rational basis for morality, the free will, consciousness, ... and the conclusion, the only philosophy worth the name is analytic philosophy.²⁰

3.4 Ahistoricism

Analytic philosophy has been characterized from the very beginning by a deep hostility towards tradition. What does it mean? It means considering something (a philosophical theory, an argument, ...) independent of the context in which it arose and the one who discusses it treats it as if it is contemporaneous with him. For example, in his works, Quine portrayed Descartes as a villain rather than a hero. When Garber read directly from the original sources of Descartes, he found that "Quine was reacting to the Descartes of lore and legend and not to the real, flesh-and-blood philosopher."²¹ Analytic philosophers treated the other analytically oriented philosophers as contemporaries. Peter Hylton says that analytic philosophy seems to think of itself as taking place in a timeless movement.²²

Analytic philosophy perceived itself to be transcending traditional philosophy, and so, disregarded the history of philosophy for the most part of 20th century. At Cornell, Anthony Crafton found that the teachers and students of philosophy showed little interest in history. He cites the example of his friend who refused a good job at a liberal arts college, because they wanted him to teach history of philosophy which he said he could

not do! "They wanted me to teach a survey of the history of philosophy. To do it I would have had to teach history of ideas. Of course I couldn't go there."²³ At Princeton he found a similar situation. He found a notice, "Just say no to the history of ideas" adorning one door in 1879 Hall.²⁴

Some analytic philosophers (historians of philosophy) rebelled against this anti-historical attitude and slowly historical consciousness began to flower among analytic philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century, about which we shall see in the following pages.

4. WRITING THE HISTORY OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

4.1 Emerging Historical Consciousness

Early analytic philosophers sometimes addressed the views of a philosopher from previous centuries, but they frequently failed to combine philosophical acumen with historical care. So they fell into faulty, anachronistic interpretations of earlier philosophers.²⁵ But commentators in the analytic tradition revolted against such a way of doing and began to investigate the origins of their own tradition. Their evaluation of how analytic philosophers wrote history of philosophy as well as their own history, is outlined in the following paragraphs.

4.1.1 Daniel Garber

He says that some historians of philosophy revolted against some practices of writing of the history of analytic philosophy at that time. What are those practices? (1) There was a tendency to substitute rational reconstructions of a philosopher's view for the views themselves. (2) There was a tendency of focussing only on a narrow group of philosophers (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume). (3) Even within these figures, there was a tendency to focus on a few works (and exclude others) which best fit with the analytic philosophers' current conception of the subject of philosophy. (4) There was a tendency to work exclusively from translations, not taking pains to go to the original sources. (5) There was a tendency to ignore the secondary sources that were not originally written in English. (6) There was a tendency to treat philosophical positions as if they were those presented by contemporaries.²⁶ Having thus rebelled, they began to interpret the more well known problems and views of historical figures, (1) in the context of the whole of their work, (2) in their intellectual context, i.e., how their work is related to that of the preceding generation of thinkers and (3) in the broad social environment in which they lived and thought and wrote.²⁷

4.1.2 Hans-Johann Glock

Hans-Johann Glock claimed that there was a 'prevailing scholasticism' in analytic philosophy. It is shown in the following: (1) There was a tendency to focus on a very

narrow range of authors and issues. (2) There was a general disinclination to explain as to why those issues and authors were important. (3) There was a tendency to treat many fundamental issues as settled once and for all. (4) There was a predilection for technicalities, irrespective of their usefulness. (5) There was an attitude that those who do not conform to their standards and preconceptions are simply unprofessional.²⁸

4.1.3 Peter Hylton

His book *Russell, Idealism and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy* is an example of the shift in outlook that we are here outlining. Though it was known that Russell passed through a Hegelian phase before he developed his logical atomism, his early writings were not seriously investigated. Analytic philosophers considered only his analytical writings. In this book, Peter Hylton engages seriously with Russell's early writings. And he tries to show that Russell's logical atomism arose out of his reaction against Hegelianism which he defended at the beginning of his career.²⁹ Hylton criticises the concept of the history of philosophy that analytic philosophers had, i.e., purely argumentative engagement with the classic texts, as a defence mechanism, which made those theories into unsuccessful predecessors of later theories. His objection was that "a philosophical theory has no determinate content and no unambiguously specifiable consequences, independently of how it is interconnected with other theories."³⁰

4.1.4 Others

The last two decades have seen the emergence of historiography of analytic philosophy as a subdiscipline within analytic philosophy. In addition to the authors named above, the other important figures in this field are Tom Balwin, Hans Sluga, Nicholas Griffin, Peter Hacker, Ray Monk and Michael Beaney.³¹

4.2 Evolution of the Historical Work on Analytic Philosophy

Evolution of the historical work on analytic philosophy can be arranged into three stages: Proto-history, New wave history and Analytic history.³²

4.2.1 Proto-history

Characteristic features of work in this stage are: (1) It was the first hand account of analytic philosophy. (2) The writers took for granted that analytic philosophy originated at the turn of the twentieth century with Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein as a radical break with idealism and traditional philosophy, and that it was founded in a novel method of philosophy, the analysis of language. J. O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis* (1956), G. J. Warnock, *English Philosophy Since 1900* (1958) and *The Revolution in Philosophy* (1963), which is a collection which includes essays of A. J. Ayer, P. F. Strawson and Gilbert Ryle, belong to this first stage of historical work on analytic philosophy.³³

4.2.2 New Wave History

Historians of this second stage, whom Aaron Preston describes as new wave historians, are Nicholas Griffin, Peter Hacker, Ray Monk, Peter Hylton and Michael Beaney. They discovered that no view traditionally connected with analytic philosophy are actually shared by all analytic philosophers, not even the linguistic thesis, which in the proto-history period was absolutely essential to define analytic self-image.³⁴ What else holds them together into a group called analytic philosophy?

4.2.3 Analytic History

We may not call it a stage in the sense of historically being subsequent to the previous stage as it is contemporaneous with it. This history was written by analytic philosophers who work mainly in what are now called 'core analytic' areas (philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology). They wrote history according to analytic standards i.e., history was studied in the form of rational reconstructions of the views of historical figures, usually removed from their contexts and anachronistically assimilated to current interests and approaches. Here we see the application of the analytic approach to the history of analytic philosophy itself. They worked within the parameters that analytic philosophy originated with G. E. Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein and that their method of philosophizing is language analysis. Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytic Philosophy* (1993) and Scott Soames, *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century* (2003) would be classified as belonging to the third stage called analytic history.³⁵

4.3 What is Analytic Philosophy?

One might wonder at the appropriateness of the this question, at this point of the presentation because all through the paper we have talked about analytic philosophy, and at the end we are asking the question, what is analytic philosophy! Normally such a question is placed at the beginning of the paper. But it is placed here, because we want to know what it really is, as it is revealed by the recent researches in analytic history.

We are aware that there are varied definitions of analytic philosophy in circulation, in fact a first timer who takes up to the reading of analytic philosophy is left wondering as to how it is to be understood. It is not the case only with beginners but also with analytic philosophers.

Hans-Johann Glock has grouped together these definitions: *doctrinal* (based on the doctrines propounded by analytic philosophers), *topical* (based on the topics in which analytic philosophers are interested), *methodological* (based on the methodology they employ in philosophising), *stylistic* (based on the style of their philosophising), *genetic* (based on the lineage of influence on one another) and *family resemblance* (based on

overlapping features).³⁶ One cannot define a philosophical school without doctrinal basis which pieces together everything else. This doctrinal definition, called as the 'received view' by Aaron Preston, has two characteristics: (1) It says that analytic philosophy is a school, i.e., it has a set of doctrines. (2) It accepts that analytic philosophy originated at the turn of the twentieth century, with G. E. Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein.³⁷

But to our dismay, we find that recent scholarship (new wave history) has shown that there is no 'set' of doctrines of analytic philosophy which is accepted by all, not even by the core canonical analysts such as G. E. Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein.³⁸ So what is left of the so-called analytic philosophy? How are they held together as analytic philosophers?

Taking into consideration these facts, Aaron Preston proposes an illusionist view of analytic philosophy. "The illusionist takes the current work in the history of analytic philosophy to indicate that the received view was simply a guise that enabled a non-doctrinal and so non-philosophical group of some sort to come to dominate academic philosophy in various geographic regions by masquerading as a philosophical school."³⁹ Aaron Preston has concluded that analytic philosophy did not exist as a philosophical school having common doctrines, but gave an impression of being so. The doctrinal definition of analytic philosophy is a good definition which serves only the purpose of getting initiated and acquainted with the tradition but does nothing more. Once we get acquainted with the tradition, we realize that the definition is not correct.

But how to reconcile this conclusion/view with the phenomenal growth and academic influence of the tradition? The growth of the tradition indicates that it had or it promised to offer humanity something necessary, and something novel. Or else it would not have received such an overwhelming welcome that it did receive in the intellectual and other circles. Or was its acceptance due to the general opinion regarding the apparent uselessness of metaphysics for life (because knowing metaphysics does not change ones life - life continues as before)? Such a thought would definitely have found an answer in analytic philosophers' declaration that many of metaphysical statements are non-sensical.

Preston opted for doctrinal definition, because if the school claims to be a philosophical school, it should have a philosophy. But is not analytic philosophy a methodological philosophy, trying to understand how the phenomenon of human language works, so that it can be better utilized to achieve its purpose. If it is also a methodological enterprise, why not give a methodological definition? Or can we not define analytic philosophy from the object of their enquiry, the phenomenon of human language? Because it was born with this and the various philosophers are trying to do that. I think, there is more work to be done in this line.

5. CONCLUSION

A modest attempt has been made, in the preceding pages, to study: (1) how the analytic philosophers viewed the history of philosophy that had preceded them, and (2) how the history of the analytic tradition has been viewed by historians and what it has revealed about the analytic tradition. Both these questions fall in the ambit of historiography of analytic philosophy. It is not an 'analytic' philosophy of history that we have done but a historiography of analytic tradition.

The above study has revealed that the analytic tradition has had a peculiar relationship to history because it was characterized by ahistoricism for a good part of its history. They had consciously neglected the study of history of philosophy. Secondly, the study has revealed that recent historical works on the history of the analytic tradition have brought to light the fact that the so-called analytic philosophers, even the core canonical figures, do not seem to have any common element that would characterize them as belonging to one school, the analytic philosophy.

Man cannot but think historically, i.e., one's thinking (way of thinking, object of thinking, feeling that accompanies thought, etc.) has a relation to the social as well as to one's own personal past. One's thinking has also a relation to the future which is already present to the social and the individual consciousness as expectations. Such being the case, one cannot deny the history or historical influence. The present cannot be understood without the reference to the past. The analytic philosophers have been influenced by the preceding generations, no doubt, either positively or negatively, but they seem to turn a blind eye to it.

Writing the history of the past (as well as studying the history) is not a pure narration or description of events as they happened. It can never be so. Actually, history is an interpretation of events by the author, i.e., bits of information (information!) are interpreted into a coherent story (history!). Therefore, history writing is not neutral. The historian makes a hypothesis and accordingly fuses the bits of information. So, history is a fabrication. It does not mean to say that it is not true. It is true but need not exactly be true! For the historian provides a special spectacles through which to see the past events.

As is the case with history writing, so is case with historiography and interpretation of history. The historiographer proposes a hypothesis and fits together the different pieces of information to prove his hypothesis! Interpreting history, Hegel would like to show that German form of state, culture and religion as the end or the goal towards which history has been progressing, or evolving. Marx saw history as a constant struggle between classes, which would end in communism. Fukuyama would see history as proceeding towards a stage where all countries of the world would have a democracy of the American genre. The universe, however, will march ahead in spite of these

prophecies. And what is more, it may not proceed in the way foretold by these prophets! Because, there is someone else who is guiding the universe, God. We must leave some work to Him.

This also reveals the greatness as well as the smallness of man. The greatness of man is that he can know. The limitedness of man is that he cannot know as the Omniscient knows. There is so much that the reality has to reveal to us. Reality unfolds itself to us in the daily revelations. But our grasp of it is limited. Avvaiyar, a Tamil poetess of old, has rightly proclaimed our limitedness, "that which we know is a fistful, whereas what we do not know is as big as the universe" (*katrathu kaiyalavu kallathathu ulagalavu*).

NOTES

1. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," in J. Fieser and B. Dowden (Eds.) *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <www.iep.utm.edu/a/analytic.htm> (20.11.2006), 3.
2. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," 3.
3. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," 7.
4. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," 9.
5. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," 11.
6. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," 12.
7. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," 14.
8. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," 16.
9. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," 17.
10. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," 18-19.
11. Ralph Humphries, "Analytic and Continental: The Division in Philosophy," *The Monist* 82 (1999) 2, 257.
12. "Continental Europe," *Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia* <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/continental_Europe> (08.12.2006), 1.
13. Richard Kearney, "Introduction," *Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy*, London and New York, Routledge, 1994, 1.
14. Richard Campbell, "The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash Between 'Analytic' and 'Continental' Philosophy," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 9(2001)2, 343. It is also available at <www.tandf.co.uk/journals>
15. Richard Campbell, "The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash Between 'Analytic' and 'Continental' Philosophy." Although the clash between 'analytic' and 'continental' seems geographical and political, there is also metaphysical disagreement especially with reference to Platonism. Analytic philosophers are platonic where as continental philosophers reject platonism in all its forms. Refer to the article for an elaborate treatment of this.
16. Terry Pinkard, "Analytics, Continentals and Modern Skepticism," *The Monist* 82(1999)2, 189.
17. Ralph Humphries, "Analytic and Continental: The Division in Philosophy," *op.cit.*, 255-257.
18. Michael Dummett, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1993, 168.
19. Aaron Preston, draft chapter "The Identity Crisis in Analytic Philosophy" in his proposed book *Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion*, at <www.malone.edu/media/1/38/85/03-chapter1-crisis.pdf> (20.11.2006), 16.

20. Aaron Preston, draft chapter: "The Identity Crisis in Analytic Philosophy" in his proposed book *Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion*, 20-21.
21. Daniel Garber, "Philosophy and the Scientific Revolution," in J. B. Schneewind (Ed.), *Teaching New Histories of Philosophy*, Princeton, Princeton University Centre for Human Values, 2004, 3. It is also available at <www.pdcnet.org/pdf/tmhp.html>
22. Peter Dews, *The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy*, London & New York, Verso, 1996, 60.
23. Anthony Crafton, "A Note From Inside the Teapot," in J. B. Schneewind (Ed.), *Teaching New Histories of Philosophy*, Princeton, Princeton University Centre for Human Values, 2004, 318. It is also available at <www.pdcnet.org/pdf/tmhp.html>
24. Anthony Crafton, "A Note From Inside the Teapot."
25. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, 20.
26. Daniel Garber, "Philosophy and the Scientific Revolution," *op. cit.*, 2.
27. Daniel Garber, "Philosophy and the Scientific Revolution," 2.
28. Aaron Preston, "The Identity Crisis in Analytic Philosophy," *Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion*, *op. cit.* 12.
29. Peter Dews, *The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, 60-61.
30. Peter Dews, *The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy*, 61.
31. Aaron Preston, "Analytic Philosophy," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, 21.
32. Aaron Preston, "The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy," a paper presented at British Society for the History of Philosophy conference on Philosophy and Historiography, organised in Robinson College, Cambridge, from 3-5, 2006, 1-10. For the three-stage evolution of historical work on analytic philosophy, I have based myself on him.
33. Aaron Preston, "The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy," 1-2.
34. Aaron Preston, "The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy," 3.
35. Aaron Preston, "The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy," 4.
36. Aaron Preston, "The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy," 5.
37. Aaron Preston, "The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy," 8.
38. Aaron Preston, "The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy," 8.
39. Aaron Preston, "The Implications of Recent Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy," 9.